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TERRORISM AS A PERCEIVED THREAT TO US ARMED FORCES
SERVING OCONUS AND THE ARMY'S PROGRAM OF ADDRESSING
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
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
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STUDENT ESSAY

TERRORISM AS A PERCEIVED THREAT TO US ARMED FORCES SERVING OCONUS AND THE ARMY'S PROGRAM OF ADDRESSING THAT THREAT

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SAM RAINES, EN

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TERRORISM AS A PERCEIVED THREAT
TO US ARMED FORCES SERVING OCONUS
AND
THE ARMY'S PROGRAM OF ADDRESSING
THAT THREAT

AN INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by


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27 March 1986



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ABSTRACT

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--The basic question is whether or not the Army's initiatives toward terrorism counteraction is actually filtering down to the soldier level and what are the perceptions of Army efforts at countering terrorism as viewed primarily from the Battalion Command level. A follow-on area of interest is the level of comfort with information, preparedness, and general feelings of vulnerability as expressed at the Battalion Command level of responsibility. To assess these areas it was necessary to conduct research as to the current and projected trends in terrorism, the threat against US forces serving overseas and then to highlight those programs currently directed by Department of State, Defense, and Army. The heart of the paper evolves around a survey administered to the US Army War College Resident Class of 1986. This survey captured perceptions of the Class relative to terrorism preparation, counteraction, programs, and to a degree measured the feeling of vulnerability of those serving outside the United States. The effort was to capture the family "perception." For comparison a recent survey of State Department Personnel was used to project parallel perceptions of other Americans who are serving overseas.-- It was determined that while there are numerous on going efforts by Department of the Army, the actual, expected result is not reaching the soldier level or meeting his needs. Further, the Army appears to have a significant weakness in its preparation/information program and there are very real feelings of vulnerabilities and lack of preparedness among families serving abroad. The Army should conduct a detailed examination of current programs and initiate, with renewed emphasis at every level of command, a terrorism counteraction program that is applicable for soldiers and families of all ranks. In the wake of recent terrorist threats, the Army can not afford to treat terrorism as anything less than a high priority issue.

PREFACE

The past few years have witnessed a significant increase in international terrorism both in frequency of occurrence, and in the lethality of extreme violence. The trend in international terrorism reveals a sharp rise in the death and injury rate of innocent people. There are indications that this trend will continue. Americans, who for the most part in recent years, have been on the fringe of terrorist activities, are now finding themselves very much involved. Americans are now not only having chance encounters with terrorist but are in fact becoming a very vulnerable and sought out target. Logically, US military personnel and their families who are serving in large numbers overseas are becoming more vulnerable and exposed in the mid to high terrorist threat environment. The United States historically has had a reputation of "taking care of its own." The question now, in light of the increased threat: is enough being done to take care of service personnel and their families.

This paper will initially explore this issue, first by listing several of the current definitions of terrorism, secondly by reviewing the current data and trends of terrorist activity, and then list the current programs and initiatives in terrorism counteraction conducted at the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army level. The heart of the paper will revolve around a survey that was administered to the US Army War College class of 1986. This survey was designed to record attitudes relative to terrorism and to measure the perceived effectiveness of the higher level programs and initiatives. Focusing at the recent Battalion Commander level is expected to provide a view from the soldier level.

Research on this paper reveals an almost inexhaustible listing of sources from which one could develop any number of positions on terrorism. This report will be greatly limited to the sources that were readily available. By far, the greatest number of sources on terrorism are classified from SECRET to echelons beyond TOP SECRET. For the sake of control, this report has been developed in a totally unclassified manner and in all probability will omit certain relevant facts that are essential for a completely objective review. The information presented herein should however, be sufficient to draw some conclusions on just how well the Army's terrorism and counteraction programs are being received at the battalion level and below. The survey material is computed in a nonscientific statistical manner but rather in raw numerical values, capable of presenting a picture. Readers are encouraged to focus on those sections that present the survey results and express the written comments of the survey respondents.

Results: This report established that there is a very real threat to US service personnel serving overseas. It concludes that while there are many well meant programs and initiatives for terrorism awareness and counteraction, the real emphasis is not "perceived" as meeting the expectations of the O5 level commander, his/her family, and not really filtering down to the soldier level in a timely and useful manner. War College respondents indicated a high degree of interest and concern of terrorism but reflected a level of unpreparedness, vulnerability, and frustration at the inability to receive timely and useful information. There was a perception that the Army might not be placing a strong emphasis on terrorism awareness. Another perception was that the soldiers family serving overseas was vulnerable, unprepared, uniformed, and received very low protection.

Conclusion: The report recognizes that the results are a "snapshot" look but concludes that there is sufficient information to indicate that there may be a problem and that a more indepth study should be conducted. It is recommended that the terrorism counteraction and awareness initiatives be reevaluated from a higher level that incorporates all available data in order to assess if the Army's programs are meeting the needs of the soldier and his family serving outside the United States. With the criticality of recent terrorist activity, it is suggested that the recommended action be accomplished as expeditiously as possible.

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INTRODUCTION

We interrupt this program with an ABC News Special bulletin. . . .

A familiar chill comes over our body; a sick feeling starts way down in the pit of our stomach and we move closer to the television with a dread fear, thinking, "Oh God, not again."

Suddenly the screen is filled with madness. We see smoke and dust. There are people running everywhere, sirens are blaring in the background. There are screams and wailing. We can make out lifeless, twisted, and torn bodies. There are policemen with guns drawn. And then we hear the shocked and choking voice of the news-caster. . . .

It happened only moments ago, a powerful bomb exploded, shattering what was a quiet and peaceful area. A splinter terrorist group in a phone call to our station has claimed responsibility for this attack. There are many dead and injured here. The victims appear to be innocent people who were at the wrong place at the wrong time. The fear and horror can be seen on the faces of the survivors. The authorities so far have no real clues. . . .

Sound familiar? This is not a scene out of a Hollywood disaster movie, it is a real life occurrence that is happening with alarming frequency. Another terrorist attack somewhere in the world. There is horrible damage, great loss of lives--innocent lives.

Although the situation described above is fictitious, we can all agree that the chance of such an occurrence is becoming increasingly higher each day. From fiction to fact, the following are quotes from some rather successful and high level officers:

. . . the Army only pays lip service to terrorism preparation . . . we (the Army) always seem to react to problems rather than make the hard decisions in advance that could prevent or minimize the situation . . . lack of preparation and protection for overseas families sure doesn't correlate with "Year

of the Family' . . . real protection stopped at the Major General level where I was stationed . . . the naivety toward terrorism at some post borders on incompetence and is criminal . . . it's a matter of time until we lose a school. . . .

Comments from a disgruntled soldier? No, these are a few representative comments from officers attending the US Army War College. If you are surprised, read on.

The alarming rate of terrorist activity and the recent trend to strike indiscriminately, particularly at Americans abroad has given way to new cause for alarm and concern. The American serviceperson and his family serving in an overseas assignment can now with some degree of certainty consider themselves as potential targets of terrorism. Why? Are service personnel concerned? What is being done to help them? Is what is being done considered enough? These are the questions that this paper will explore.

TERRORISM DEFINED

Although volumes are now being written about terrorism it is important to review current definitions of terrorism. The review will allow the reader to have some understanding and perhaps a reference point from which to assess the findings of this paper.

A broad general definition of terrorism is: the systematic and indiscriminate use of violence--or the threat of violence--as a leverage to influence behavior.¹ Terrorism is viewed as systematic because it occurs according to a plan, carefully structured for a predicted outcome. It is not a random act. But, recent history dictates it is most certainly an act of indiscriminate results. There are no rules as

to who may be impacted. Victims, be they guilty or innocent are still victims. The method employed by terrorist is always violence. Violence is the one act that can and will raise two of the very basic instincts of man--horror and fear. Violence is by far the most effective means of elevating the consciousness and awareness of the masses.

Terrorism is also defined as an act that is designed to further a particular set of views or beliefs that is usually accomplished by coercive intimidation.² An expansion of that definition includes a cause that must be exploited. It neither recognizes time or place or anyone who is unfortunately in its way.

The United States Army in TRADOC Pam 525-37, defines terrorism as the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious, or ideological in nature.³ It is accomplished through intimidation, coercion, or by instilling fear through threats. It is considered a criminal act, often symbolic and intended to influence an audience far beyond the immediate victims.

A difference arises in that definitions of terrorism as we most often hear them and understand them, are applicable only to our society or countries who have a similar society, social structure and way of life. In many areas of the world where terrorism is ongoing, it is viewed quite differently. Customs, laws, and society as a whole may be very different and actions we would call "terrorism" may be looked upon as very normal behavior patterns. We often refer to the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLO) as a terrorist organization. They see themselves as "freedom fighters," carrying on the struggle for liberation and independence. By our laws they are criminal. By their standards they are exhibiting normal reactions. There is no real concern over the loss

of innocent life. It is at this point that the American serving overseas becomes vulnerable, especially if he or she represents a government or political theme that contradicts or opposes those who will routinely use violent means to attain their goals.

The bottom line of terrorism is that above all it is a form of political activity, an extension of politics that involves extreme violence as a form of strategy. One could argue that it is, in essence, warfare on a low intensity scale. The Army is in the business of combatting various forms of low intensity warfare; terrorism must be no exception.

Research indicates that terrorism is not undirected, purposeless violence. It is not the random occurrence such as an earthquake for which mankind is generally unprepared and helpless to its consequences. We know that terrorists and those who support them have very definite goals and that violence used to achieve these goals is designed to create an atmosphere of fear.⁴ The horrors are not new manifestations of society but rather are depraved opponents of society--perhaps opponents of civilization itself. If we are aware of these facts then one could and should argue that being "prepared" is not impossible; in fact it becomes an imperative course of action. The Army is the key agency responsible for creating that level of preparedness that is required for its personnel and their families.

Terrorists want people to feel vulnerable, helpless and defenseless; they want people to lose faith in their own government's capacity to protect them. This could ultimately undermine the legitimacy of the government, its policies, or both. It is with this level of awareness that the Army must focus on preparing its personnel

to operate in the potential hostile terrorist environment. The Army can ill afford to wait for the "earthquake" but rather must aggressively pursue those policies that lead to well informed, trained, proficient and prepared personnel. The Army must take the steps necessary to insure to the maximum possible that "perceptions of vulnerability" do not exist among the forces or their families, especially those serving overseas. Soldiers and their families must never lose faith that the Army and in fact the government is doing all that it can to insure their well-being and safety. It is these concerns and beliefs that led to the formulation of this paper, the related survey and subsequent assessment of "perceptions" of those recently serving overseas.

The purpose of this paper is not to debate "what is" terrorism but rather to focus on the increasing threat of terrorism to the military, the current ongoing initiatives by the military to prepare and develop awareness, and finally attempt to capture perceptions on the success of these programs as viewed from the battalion level.

TRENDS IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY

The statistical data quoted in this trend analysis was extracted from two sources. The 1983 data was taken from the US Department of State's Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1983 published in September 1984. The best statistics that could be found in open source literature for 1984 were provided by the Office of Special Planning, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.⁵ These statistics do not represent all terrorist acts, particularly those accomplished by personnel indigenous to a country, and those acts

committed in the Soviet bloc countries, Asia, and Africa. Data for 1985 is not readily available at this time.

In reviewing the total number of international terrorist incidents for the past 6 years (Figure 1) several trends become obvious. First, there are periods of increases in terrorist acts followed by decreases. These decreases may be attributed to the effectiveness of governments combatting terrorism in the early 1980's and to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon that disrupted terrorist organizations in the Middle East and their followers elsewhere. Secondly, 1981 and 1982 could have been years of rebuilding for older terrorist groups and years of development and birth for new groups. Thirdly, the use of large-scale kidnappings, the taking of hostages at the United States Embassy in Iran, and the mass and indiscriminate killings and maiming in the bombings of the United States Embassy and Marine headquarters in Beirut showed a weak side of the United States. As a result terrorist groups worldwide found they could get media attention, influence public opinion, and accomplish some of their objectives. Because of this perceived success an average of approximately 500 incidents per year for the years 1979-1983 grew to an unprecedented 700 incidents for 1984--a rise of 41 percent over the 1983 total of 500, and to over 800 incidents for 1985. Bombings, the most popular terrorist tactic, appear to show the greatest increase.

The majority of international terrorism incidents took place in Western Europe, which had 38.5 percent of the 1984 (Figure 2) incidents. A total of 151 terrorist attacks were directed against US interests worldwide (Figure 3) in 1984--this is a decrease of approximately 29 percent from the 1983 total of 205 incidents and is the first decline

FIGURE 1

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS 1979 - 1985



GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS, 1984




FIGURE 2

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS AND PROPERTY, 1984

	NORTH AMERICA	LATIN AMERICA	WESTERN EUROPE	USSR/EASTERN EUROPE	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	MIDDLE EAST	ASIA/PACIFIC	TOTAL
TOTAL	1	58	45	1	9	27	10	151
BARRICADE-HOSTAGE							1	5
BOMBING	1	33	25	1	1	12	2	75
ARMED ATTACK		9	6		1	5	1	22
HIJACKING		2			1	2	2	7
ARSON		5	4		1		1	11
KIDNAPPING		2			3	8	3	16
OTHER	3		10		2			15

FIGURE 3

seen since 1981 (Figure 4). The distribution of incidents directed against the United States shows that Latin America (38.4 percent) is the primary area for attacks against the United States while Western Europe is in a close second place with 29.8 percent of the incidents (Figure 5). Most acts directed against the United States military took place in Western Europe (74.1 percent) as opposed to Latin America where only 3.7 percent of the incidents were directed against the military (Figure 6).

As mentioned earlier bombings were the most common type of tactic used (Figure 7) and American businesses were the primary targets (Figure 8). In 1983 the United States military was the primary target (47 incidents), but 1984 saw a reduction of 43 percent or 27 incidents (Figure 9). Preliminary data for 1985 shows again another increase.

Terrorist groups today are more violent than ever before. The objective of terrorists is to call public attention to their cause. By employing brutal and bloody violence terrorists construct a general climate of fear that intimidates governments and populations. Leftist terrorists are usually responsible for most of the world's terrorist violence, however, in recent years rightist groups have conducted a very significant number of the most violent incidents. The year 1983 was the most violent since record keeping began; a total of 1,925 casualties (652 killed and 1,273 injured) during 116 international terrorist incidents. On the United States side most of the fatalities for 1983 occurred as a result of the truck bombings of the United States Embassy in Beirut and the Marine headquarters at the Beirut airport. If you disregard these two incidents only five US fatalities occurred in 1983 and 1984 had a total of 12 fatalities, making 1984 one of the three most lethal years during the past 10 years (Figure 10).

**INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS AND PROPERTY,
1979 - 1984**

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	TOTAL
TOTAL	188	178	163	211	205	151	1096
KIDNAPPING	8	10	9	8	10	16	61
BARRICADE-HOSTAGE	6	7	1	3	8	5	30
ARMED ATTACK	36	33	29	18	24	22	162
HIJACK	6	4	10	1	1	7	29
BOMBING	92	76	72	109	96	75	520
ARSON	31	23	25	59	36	11	185
OTHER	9	25	17	13	30	15	109

FIGURE 4

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS AGAINST US, 1984




FIGURE 5

**GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
TERRORIST INCIDENTS AGAINST US MILITARY, 1984**




FIGURE 6

**INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST US
CITIZENS AND PROPERTY, 1984**




FIGURE 7

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST US CITIZENS AND PROPERTY, 1984




FIGURE 8

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS
AGAINST U.S. MILITARY

	LATIN AMERICA	WESTERN EUROPE	MIDDLE EAST	AFRICA
BOMBING	10	1	3	1
ARMED ATTACK	1	2	0	0
HIJACKING				1
ARSON		4		
THEFT		2	1	
OTHER		2		

FIGURE 9

U.S. FATALITIES PER TERRORIST ATTACK

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>NUMBER OF FATALITIES</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS</u>	<u>FATALITIES PER INCIDENTS</u>
1984	12	151	.08
1983	5	205	.02*
1982	7	211	.03
1981	7	163	.04
1980	9	178	.05
1979	15	188	.08
1978	9	123	.07
1977	4	84	.05
1976	7	125	.06
1975	18	104	.17

* 1983 FIGURES DO NOT REFLECT BEIRUT BOMBINGS

FIGURE 10

Because terrorists can make the biggest impression with the least possible risk of identification, bombings have become their favorite tactic. The growth in the number of bombings is also a reflection of the better training in the use of explosives available to terrorists and the increased availability of high-quality explosives. The Soviet Union, its Eastern Europe allies, and Libya, Cuba, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) have supplied many terrorist groups with plastique and other explosives to build bombs.⁶ Using these explosives they have produced vehicle bombs which are totally indiscriminate in who they kill or what they damage. These types of weapons were the prime weapons of choice in 1983 and the Department of State reports that 50 such attacks occurred of which 30 took place in the Middle East, primarily Lebanon.⁷ Officials in the Department of Defense indicate that vehicle bombings in 1984 will exceed 1983. Emerging data for 1985 continues to reflect an increase.

In summary, American interests were the targets of fewer terrorist attacks in 1984, however, when attacks did occur they were deadlier. The year 1985 saw an increase of attacks of American interest. Bombings, kidnappings, and armed attacks against Americans are the most favored tactics of terrorist groups. American businesses operate with highest risk in Latin America, whereas the United States military's highest risk is in Western Europe.⁸ There is no indication of a reduction in international terrorism, to the contrary it increased significantly during the year 1985. United States personnel and facilities abroad are primarily targeted by Marxist-Leninist factions and Islamic fundamentalist who see the United States as an imperialistic world power. What are the trends expected for the future?

The current director, Office for Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning, US Department of State, as recently as September 13, 1985 provided the following forecast.⁹

First:

International terrorism will remain a prominent factor despite the intensified efforts of governments around the world . . . increased weapons availability, mass communication to insure publicity, and travel is easier into 'open' countries. Mass destruction weapons have made regular warfare too costly while terrorism becomes the ideal way for a cheap strike at ones adversaries with little or no reaction possible.

This is clearly evident today as the United States may be able to prove that state supported terrorism evolves perhaps from Syria or Libya yet the super power is almost powerless to do anything for fear that any retaliation may escalate into a major war or confrontation.

Second: "The U.S. Problem will most likely tend to be more external than internal." This suggests that the greatest threat should occur outside the borders of the United States. Since we are considering those American military forces and their families serving outside the United States, it logically follows that this is where the greatest effort should go to control or diminish the problem as much as possible.

Third: "Open societies will continue to remain the principal target and target area for terrorist."

Fourth: "There will continue to be an unmistakable rise in state-supported terrorism from small countries such as Iran, Libya, Syria, Cuba, and Nicaragua." This prediction follows the first in that these small countries can be expected to continue to export terrorism to the larger, more developed, and open countries. This follows terrorist

strategy as any terrorist act with violence will take on far greater significance in terms of horror when it occurs in a modern civilized nation. Actions that are hardly noticed in Iran for example, take on massive proportion when executed in some place like Vienna or Stuttgart. The point here is that the serviceperson really doesn't have to be assigned in one of the small, underdeveloped countries that is ripe with violence. Vulnerability will occur in the larger more developed areas also. It becomes more profitable for the terrorist to export his terrorism to where the United States soldiers are located, the end results and impact will be much greater.

Fifth: "There is a definite trend toward greater lethality." The days of a terrorist action being an occasional kidnapping or isolated assassination appear to have ended. Now we see massive bombs, capable of significant damage with often heavy collateral casualties. Terrorist strikes today almost always end with high injury rates, multiple deaths, and considerable destruction. Witness the December airport bombings in Europe. The intent seemingly was to blast or deface a particular nation's airline but look at the resulting indiscriminate death caused by random hand grenades and automatic weapon fire. Technology of sophisticated weapons today allow terrorist to create extensive destruction with very little effort. Since the technology is not going to reverse itself, it becomes imperative that ways and means be employed to "prepare and protect."

If one is to believe the predictions of the expert, and there are no reasons to doubt the facts, then one can conclude that the future, relative to terrorism, is somewhat grim. It appears that terrorism and related acts will continue despite the best efforts of the civilized

world. In order to prepare for the future, the Army may do well in regarding terrorism as a form of warfare. Sometimes in war, the best defense is a good offense. I would not suggest an offense in terms of striking out blindly with military forces but rather one of a more practical nature. Use of swift and deadly force to deal with terrorism should not be ruled out but those type actions are not the thrust of this paper. What is proposed is a strong aggressive program of training with positive efforts directed at creating a high degree of awareness. The goal must be to instill knowledge about the situation, eliminate distorted perceptions, and create a strong sense of preparedness. If the Army is serious about commitment to its soldiers and families then this training must receive considerably increased emphasis in the future.

THE THREAT AGAINST THE US ARMY

The United States Army's concern over terrorism has risen dramatically over the last decade because of the progressively increasing number of terrorist attacks against US personnel and US interest abroad.¹⁰ The Army characteristically is the one service usually operating with large numbers of personnel in those areas that historically have been considered "hot spots."

Over the past 16 years, incidents of international terrorism have increased steadily. Since 1968, when record keeping was initiated, there have been in excess of 10,537 incidents reported worldwide. Approximately 45 percent of these incidents have occurred in the last 5 years.¹¹ Severity of these incidents, loss of life, and the general indiscriminate nature have greatly increased.

Europe is by far the site of the greatest number of terrorist incidents that impact Department of Defense personnel. It readily becomes a concern since considerably more military and DOD personnel are stationed in Europe than anywhere else in the world. Since 1968 there were 410 terrorist activities against DOD interests in Europe. Does not include 1985.¹² What is alarming is that 204 or 50 percent of these incidents have occurred in the last 4 years. The trend continues to rise. The threat to US personnel appears to now be higher than ever before.

The year 1983 was a tragically banner year. More than 80 percent of the world's terrorist attacks in 1983 occurred in Western Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East--areas where US servicemen are increasing their presence. In 1983 more Americans were killed and injured by acts of terrorism than in the 15 preceding years.

In 1984 there were more than 600 international terrorist incidents, a 20 percent increase over the average level of the previous 5 years. During the first 8 months of 1985 there were 480 reportable incidents, an increase over the 382 incidents that were reported for the same time period during 1984. Although the data for 1985 is still being formulated, one reliable source indicated that the year had a total of 812 reported terrorist incidents--approximately a 25 percent increase over the previous year.¹³

The year 1985 saw the wounding and killing of servicemen simply because they were American. The December 1985 bombings at Vienna and Rome airports graphically demonstrated that nothing is sacred. The innocent young children and bystanders that were killed show a new

tactic of terrorism that once was discounted. Can we now be sure that schools and housing areas are immune from becoming targets?

Terrorism as a strategy is a threat to the United States Army across the spectrum of conflict. There appears to be no likelihood that the threat will diminish in magnitude or scope in the foreseeable future. Recent acts have demonstrated that state-directed, or at least state-supported terrorism, is an inexpensive means for states to attempt to influence other states with little risk to prestige or fear of escalation. While it is difficult for many Americans to understand, there are numerous countries and terrorist organizations that openly advertise their hatred for Americans. They consider the United States to be the adversary for many diverse reasons. From 1968 to 1984 there were an estimated 650 attacks against the United States military.¹⁴ The concern is not always with the quantity of attacks, but rather with the quality. While the attack against the United States Marine compound in Beirut on 23 October 1983 killed more than 240 Marines it also caused the United States policy in the region to be modified, and triggered a series of US government security actions including closing the underground entrance to the Pentagon. Because of past terrorist successes, we can expect that terrorism will increase on a worldwide scale and that the United States military will continue to be a prime target. Although the United States Army started to develop its terrorism counteraction (TC/A) programs only recently, significant steps have been taken.

US POLICY AND INITIATIVES (DOD AND ARMY) TOWARD
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

In response to the proliferation of international terrorism, President Reagan has reaffirmed the strict "no concessions" policy of previous administrations. United States policy provides for resisting terrorist blackmail and promoting the pursuit of terrorists. The United States will not pay ransom, nor release prisoners, and will not bargain for the release of hostages.¹⁵ Through efforts on the diplomatic front, US policy encourages other governments to adopt similar policies. Host governments are expected to exercise their responsibilities under international law to protect US citizens from terrorist actions. The host government will be urged to make no concessions to terrorist demands. Any concessions to terrorist blackmail would endanger others as it would encourage terrorists to resort to additional violence to attain political objectives.¹⁶ Furthermore, the United States will respond effectively and vigorously, exercising the use of all appropriate resources at its disposal. In January 1981, on welcoming home the Tehran hostages, President Reagan stated: "Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international justice are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution." That philosophy has been echoed as recently as 1985 when President Reagan authorized US Navy jets to intercept and capture escaping terrorist following the luxury ship hijacking and murder of an American. What is the Defense Department, State Department, and US Army doing to conform to national directives?

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The lead agency for combatting terrorism abroad, as designated by the National Command Authority, is DOS. Because of the impact of DOS on US military actions in foreign countries when confronted by terrorist acts, it is appropriate to address DOS in this study. Although other governmental agencies have overseas responsibilities, none impact on DOD in this area as much as DOS. Appropriately, DOS also accepts a responsibility for protecting its employees against terrorism overseas and a review of their programs contributes to a comparative analysis of DOD programs in this area.

The Office for Combatting Terrorism is directed by an assistant secretary level director who is confirmed as an ambassador while holding the position. The director concurrently holds the position of Coordinator for Security Policies and Programs for the DOS. The basic functions of the office are as follows:

- a. Consultation and coordination with other governments on terrorism and security issues.
- b. Responding to overseas terrorist incidents.
- c. Coordinating US Government policy and response on terrorism.
- d. Coordinating internal DOS policy and programs on security and terrorism.

In support of these functions, activities include the following:

- a. Negotiating and consultation with other governments and the United Nations, NATO, etc.
- b. Chairing the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.

c. Providing direction and core personnel for task forces responding to overseas terrorist incidents to carry out the department's lead role in such incidents.

d. Developing and management of an antiterrorism training program for foreign government officials.

e. Chairing interagency advisory committee on terrorism.

f. Chairing the departmental policy group on security policies and programs and contingency planning.

g. Developing policies and programs on protection of US Government diplomatic personnel overseas and monitoring execution of these programs. Contingency planning and actions on threats to our diplomatic missions, evacuation of personnel, etc.

h. Representing DOS on the White House committee on worldwide security threats.

i. Formulating policy on protection of foreign diplomatic and consular personnel in the United States.

j. Developing and monitoring an antiterrorism training program for US personnel overseas.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 2000.12, 12 February 1982, addresses the protection of DOD personnel abroad.¹⁷ It constitutes a broad statement of responsibilities, decentralizing primary antiterrorist effort to each service. It states the scope, policies and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (ASD/ISA) and the heads of DOD components and provides guidance for each service to implement its own regulation on terrorism.

Unlike its predecessor directive, which was issued in May 1976, it distinguishes between antiterrorism and counterterrorism, thereby focusing attention on prevention (antiterrorism) as well as response (counterterrorism). The new directive also deals with terrorism without regard to location, whereas its predecessor limited the applicability of the directive to overseas.

The fundamental approach of DOD is to provide guidance and policy to DOD components, defined as Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), each military department, the Unified and Specified Commands and the defense agencies. Each component is then tasked with total responsibility for advising high risk personnel, protection of personnel, installations and activities, and coordination with commanders and chiefs of missions. The ASD/ISA is tasked to monitor and coordinate the DOD components' activities and to provide assistance to the components. Within this office, a small element staffed with two officers has the responsibility for the day to day management of this function.

The unified and specified commands are given the additional responsibility of coordinating with local police agencies and serving as points of contact with US embassies and host country officials concerning policies and measures. Within this framework the DOD components are directed to develop plans and policies to deal with the terrorist threat.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

The Army has the largest number of personnel stationed in foreign countries. It became apparent that specific measures were necessary to

assure terrorism had minimum impact on service personnel and the mission of the Army.

Acting on DOD Directive 2000.12, the Army implemented programs to combat terrorism. The worldwide diversification of Army troop locations caused Department of the Army (DA) to take a centralized policy, decentralized execution approach to the problem. DA directed that certain activities take place to deter terrorist actions but left the manner in which these activities were executed to the discretion of the local commander. In implementing DOD Directive 2000.12, DA's focus was on training, information and assistance in defensive measures based on a threat analysis and the mission of a specific command. Beyond the individual training requirements, procedures for protection of personnel and property were to be formalized and contingency plans established to provide immediate response to incidents occurring on any Army installation worldwide (AR 190-52, 1983).^{18,19}

Initially, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCS PER) was responsible for all activities to combat terrorism on Army installations except for intelligence. With the publication of revised DOD Directive 2000.12 in February 1982, which defined antiterrorist and counterterrorist activities separately, the DCS PER became responsible for antiterrorism (security of facilities and persons, training, information) while the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCS OPS) assumed responsibility for counterterrorism (planning for and response to terrorist attacks). The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) has responsibility for intelligence collection and dissemination.

As may be expected in any management environment where decentralized execution of general policy is the norm, responses at the

field level to policy direction have been varied and multifaceted. In areas of high terrorist threat, commanders usually establish a single responsible office to combat terrorism and plans are developed and tested. In areas of low terrorist threat that activity results from specific efforts on the part of the activity which assumes primary interest, normally the Provost Marshal or Security Officer. While many positive actions occur on low threat installations where the Provost Marshal has an interest, the absence of an immediate terrorist threat usually results in low command interest and unwillingness to devote resources to antiterrorist training and planning. In general terms, the high threat/low threat dichotomy equates to overseas elements (high threat) versus elements in the continental United States (CONUS) (low threat). As documented in a doctoral dissertation²⁰ serious gaps, as perceived by local provost marshals, exist in planning and preparedness to combat terrorism at local levels. The study concludes that terrorism is perceived as a continuing and future threat to Army personnel, particularly overseas, and high risk personnel are not viewed as adequately protected from the threat. The study summarized these findings and recommended that action be taken by DA to address these perceptions on the part of local law enforcement officials.

The Department of the Army has taken a number of steps to maintain and improve the anti and counterterrorism posture of Army personnel.

a. The United States Army Military Police School (USAMPS) operates a staff officer level counterterrorism course to teach proper contingency planning and response to installation staff officers. The course has not been adequate to reach the wide audience requiring this training and, in the wake of the Dozier incident, it was exported to

USAREUR by a mobile team to train the many community staffs which might need to deal with such incidents. It is now intended that the course be exported on a yearly basis. Recent field experience from those returning from OCONUS assignments indicates that this program is not yet reaching widest dissemination.

b. The Army has published a pamphlet on personal security precautions against terrorist attack and requires all personnel traveling to high risk areas to receive a copy of the pamphlet. Again in the wake of the Dozier incident, the Army has directed preparation of classified and unclassified intelligence briefings and standardized terrorist awareness briefings. Lessons learned pamphlets have been obtained from the Air Force and distributed to all commands.

c. As a result of developing contingency plans to respond to terrorist incidents, the need for Special Reaction Teams (SRT) has been evident and extensive effort has been devoted to establishing and training such teams at all Army installations. These are essentially the equivalent of civilian police Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams and usually consist of specially selected and trained military police or security guards. Some major difficulties exist in this program. Since such units are "taken out of hide," staffing and training them in an era of high personnel turbulence is a burden on most police and security units, particularly at smaller installations. Equipping such units with counterterrorist weapons such as sniper rifles is a second burden which many installations have found difficult to overcome. Without regard to these difficulties, most such teams are trained and prepared to respond. The previously cited dissertation concluded that more than 70 percent of responding provost marshals

either had an SRT or had immediate access (2 hours) to one. The Air Force has established a training school for these units and the Army is currently programming attendance needs to utilize this course to "train the trainers." Because of the number of Army installations, all teams cannot attend the course. Leaders will be sent and then return to fully train their unit. A successful effort in this area will improve the training status of Army SRT's.

d. The Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) has been responsible for providing personal protective services for the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he is an Army general. The CID in the field further provides protective services to other high ranking officers when the threat justifies the need and resources permit. Local military police provide VIP protective services when the threat justifies the need or as directed. In areas of high risk, the need for protective services runs across service lines and often exceeds the capabilities of local law enforcement. Such services are provided in addition to normal investigative missions and are only staffed full time at Secretary of Defense level. In connection with providing protective services, VIP drivers and selected Military Police are to be trained in defensive driving techniques in the coming year at the Federal Training Center in Glynnco, Georgia. The CID further assures that selected investigators are trained in hostage negotiation in order to provide services to installations requiring such expertise. Again, in Western Europe the decrease in MP force structure permits only very senior officers to receive any kind of protective service.

f. The DCSPER representatives regularly participate in DOD working groups on antiterrorism making recommendations on the development of personal protective measures and coordinating logistical requirements for items like armored vehicles. The Army also participates in a quarterly meeting of the Security Chiefs of each service which includes a functioning terrorist working group as a part of its activity.

The effectiveness of the DA program rests fully on the shoulders of the local commander who must make a reasoned estimate of the terrorist threat to his command and allocate reasonable resources to counter the threat. Because of this reliance on the local commander, implementation of programs are and will be varied from virtually nonexistent to highly effective. Fortunately, this continuum of nonexistent to highly effective seems, in general, to coincide with the continuum from low threat to high threat environments. Some improvements in the policy directive can be made to match the policy realistically with the reality that exists. Attached at Annex 3 is a Terrorism Counteraction (TC/A) Initiatives Summary prepared by the Terrorism Counteraction Officer, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This summary provides an excellent background collection of the United States Army's development and implementation of a terrorism counteraction program and includes details on schools/training available, points of contact, and a collection of NQDA messages relative to terrorism.

Also, attached at Annex 4 is a recently developed (28 February 1986) Individual Training Plan for Terrorism Counteraction. This plan represents the most recent thoughts on education/training from Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas and designate certain responsible proponent agencies.

Research indicates the Army may have gotten a slower start on terrorism counteraction than its sister services but is now moving along at a rapid pace toward educating the force and increasing the awareness. The question from the field perspective is, are we (the Army) moving fast enough?

Current Perceptions In The Field. (Army War College Survey) The main focus and primary concern of this paper centers around the degree of terrorism awareness, protective measures, and training that is currently reaching soldiers and their families serving outside the United States. We have thus far discussed the trends of terrorism, the threat, and to some degree reviewed those initiatives currently being conducted by Department of State, Defense Department, and Department of the Army. It was an initial theory of this writer that the aforementioned programs and initiatives, while being conducted in a positive and well meaning manner, were not in themselves achieving the desired effect at the troop level--in essence not filtering down to the soldier/family.

Survey. In order to assess the awareness and perceptions of terrorism, a target audience of recent troop commanders and senior managers were surveyed. The survey was developed, tested, validated, and then administered to the academic year 1986 resident class of the US Army War College. While the survey is not considered "scientific" and the data was not managed by statistical analysis means, it was however expected to provide a candid response of current perceptions. A copy of the survey with instruction letter is attached at Annex 1.

The target audience was comprised of military officers in the grade of Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel, (05/06), and senior Department of the Army and Department of Defense civilians. The survey group on the whole had very recent leadership and managerial experience to the degree that a broad cross-section of the Army was represented and to a lesser degree, experience from other services. Most recent command experience of those surveyed was at the Battalion level which served to provide a perception of the "troops." Each branch of the Army was represented in-depth. Although not surveyed directly, wives did on occasion provide input to their spouses response to the survey. The survey can be expected to record a realistic and true perception on views and awareness of military leaders and provide insight as to what is happening at the soldier level. Perceptions are viewed through June 1985 since that is when the majority of respondents departed their last assignment prior to the War College.

Data: There were a total of 250 surveys administered to the class. There were 175 responses returned with a receipt rate of 70 percent. Responses were as follows:

Army-----	140
Navy/Coast Guard---	5
Air Force-----	12
Marine Corps-----	2
Civilian-----	9
Other-----	7

This section will provide the numerical response to each survey question and provide comments when necessary for clarification or as written on the survey. The actual survey at Annex 1 should be used for

reference. Respondents did not in all cases answer each question on the survey. For the sake of clarity, responses on the multiple tour questions will be reported as totals. There were numerous written comments by respondents throughout the survey and these will be used as appropriate. A collection of the written responses will be listed at question 28. Due to insufficient responses, some questions were eliminated and not addressed here.

Question 3: Have you served a tour of duty outside CONUS? There were 171 responses. One hundred forty-one respondents stated that they had served a tour outside CONUS within the last ten years; 40 had not served outside CONUS. Vietnam was excluded as a tour response.

Question 5: What was the location of assignment? Many respondents as expected, had served multiple assignments, the average being two overseas tours. Of all the assignment locations listed, a total of 35 different countries were given. A listing of those countries are at Annex 2. The predominant overseas country was Germany.

Question 6: Were you accompanied by your spouse/family? Considering the multiple assignments, there were 174 accompanied tours and 36 unaccompanied tours. There was an 83 percent accompanied tour rate.

Question 9: Prior to your overseas tour(s) did you or your family receive any briefings, information, training . . . relative to terrorism? There were 205 responses representing multiple tours. One hundred fifty-five stated that they had not received briefings or preparation on terrorist awareness. There were verbal comments on the

terrorism briefing at the precommand course but it was generally considered insufficient to warrant an adequate preparation. Fifty of the respondents affirmed that they did receive some type class or briefing, most included the precommand brief as their only information. There were good positive comments about the Navy, Air Force, and State Department briefings. There were some negative and critical comments relative to the Army briefings, (not indepth, insufficient time, vague, etc.).

Question 11: Using the scale, rate your opinion of the usefulness and adequacy . . . of information received. There were a total of 74 responses representing all tours.

No use, absolutely inadequate	Provided little help, one way or the other	Excellent, really helped me and family
-------------------------------------	---	--

SCALE-----
TOTAL RESPONSES:--- $\frac{1}{9}$ $\frac{2}{1}$ $\frac{3}{15}$ $\frac{4}{13}$ $\frac{5}{11}$ $\frac{6}{10}$ $\frac{7}{7}$ $\frac{8}{5}$ $\frac{9}{3}$

Sixty-six percent of the respondents felt that the briefings they received were between little help to no use. Respondents under eight and nine of the scale were mainly other services and civilians.

Question 12: Did your family members, particularly your spouse, receive any briefings or information? There were 51 responses to this question. Fourteen indicated that spouses had received information while 37 indicated that their spouses did not receive any information. Written responses stated that children received nothing. There were also written remarks that spouses did not receive enough information and that the briefing for spouses at precommand was inadequate.

Question 13: Was your spouse comfortable with the adequacy, usefulness . . . of information received? There were only 23 responses to this question, insufficient for any assessment. Written comments indicated that any briefing was better than nothing.

Question 14: If no to question 12, do you think that your spouse would have preferred to receive information? There were 57 responses. Fifty-five answered yes with strong comments at wanting a briefing, and two responded negatively.

Question 15: Upon arrival at your OCONUS duty station did you receive any briefings . . . relative to terrorism? There were 216 responses to this question covering multiple tours. Seventy-six stated that they had received some type of briefing while 140 responded that they had not received any information. Thus, 65 percent of the respondents indicated that they did not receive adequate information. Again there were written comments relative to the in-country precommand course briefing but most felt that it was insufficient to the need or interest level.

Question 16: If your answer to question 15 was yes, please rate the adequacy. Considering multiple tours, there were 79 responses. Sixty-one of the responses, or 77 percent, were in the six through nine range on the scale with the predominance at six and seven. Written comments reflect the, ". . . anything is better than nothing."

Question 17: Rate your opinion as to the degree of the terrorist threat during your overseas tour(s). There were a total of 210 responses to

this question. Considering totals for all tours, 75 percent of the responses were in the medium to very high threat.

	no threat		Definitely very high threat						
SCALE-----	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
TOTAL RESPONSES---	5	10	13	17	33	37	42	32	21

Question 18: Rate how comfortable you were with your knowledge of the situation . . . training . . . information . . . general preparedness. From three possible tours there were a total of 234 responses. Sixty-two of those responding indicated that they were only fair to totally unprepared.

	Totally unprepared		Fair		Everything under control				
SCALE-----	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
TOTAL RESPONSES---	7	21	29	32	36	18	26	25	20

although the responses appear fairly evenly distributed it is important to note that the vast majority of responses in the seven, eight, and nine scale rating were from other services, civilians, and Army personnel stationed in Hawaii, Alaska, and England.

Question 19: Rate how comfortable your family was with its training, knowledge, preparation . . . and awareness of terrorism. There were 192 responses from the multiple tours. Seventy-seven percent of the respondents fell in the range of fair to not at all prepared.

	Not at all	Fair	Totally completely prepared
SCALE-----	1	2	3
TOTAL RESPONSE---	40	29	23
	4	5	6
	34	16	18
	7	8	9
	8	2	

Written comments indicated that families were simply not prepared and that real awareness of protective training came only at the initiative of the individual sponsor.

Question 20: Assess and rate your family's feeling of vulnerability while serving overseas. There were 182 responses. Approximately 60 percent of the families fell into the fair to totally vulnerable range of the scale.

	Totally vulnerable	Fair	Totally protected
SCALE-----	1	2	3
TOTAL RESPONSE---	13	13	20
	4	24	38
	5	21	24
	6	18	11
	7		
	8		
	9		

The preponderance of responses falling in the seven, eight, and nine scale level were from assignments in England, Hawaii, Alaska and some embassies. The vulnerable responses came mainly from personnel assigned in Europe, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia. Europe appeared to be the largest area of concern.

Question 21: Did your soldiers or their families indicate concern over terrorism? There were 135 responses to this question. Eighty-five

responded in the affirmative while 52 answered in the negative. This response for whatever reason appears deceiving. The written comments from approximately 70 percent of the total respondents indicated that "terrorism" was often a hot topic at commanders' meetings with troops, town hall or community meetings, and wives' gatherings. The number of wives that this writer has talked with both at the War College and in a previous overseas tour leads one to conclude that the interest level, fear, and anxiety may be higher than the responses to this question indicate.

Question 22: For your most recent overseas tour, did you feel that there was a real terrorist threat? There were 141 responses. One hundred twelve or 79 percent stated that they did perceive a real threat while 29 did not conclude that there was a threat. Again, location of assignment was a large factor in this response.

Question 23: If you answered "yes" to question 22, rate the degree of threat to these areas: The one to nine scale was used with 1=no threat; 5=moderate; 9=definitely a very high threat. Numerical assessment of responses will show total responses for each area and the percent that answered moderate to very high threat (five through 9). Note: there were two additional responses beyond the totals for question 22.

Specific Area	Total Response	% moderate to very high
a. To you personally	112	49%
b. Kaserne/instillation	114	66%
c. To your housing area	111	69%
d. Facilities (commissary, PX, etc.)	110	64%
e. Children's school, including bus	107	38%
f. Shopping on economy	107	41%
g. Other (travel, TDY, convoy, military vehicle, POV plates)	30	80%

note: topics listed by "other" were written in by respondents.

The low perception for "e" above is contradicted by comments from question 28. The written comments expressed a higher concern for DOD schools. Verbal comments from respondents after the December 1985 airport incidents indicated an increased awareness that innocent children may not be exempt from terrorist action.

Question 24: For your most recent assignment, rate the security/safety for these areas: A one to nine scale was used.

Nonexistent	Poor	Fair	Good	Outstanding
-------------	------	------	------	-------------

SCALE----	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
-----------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

For each area, the total responses will be listed as well as the percentage electing fair to nonexisting security (one through 5).

Area	Total Response	% fair to nonexistent
a. Kaserne/instillation/base	137	40%
b. Housing area	132	73%
c. Facilities (PX, commissary, etc.)	136	70%
d. DOD schools, including busses	127	77%
e. On the economy	125	80%

It was agreed that security while on the economy was not really measurable. What is interesting when viewed with the written comments is that we seem to do a good job protecting the work place but housing areas and schools remain quite vulnerable.

Question 25: Did Military Police or other responsible agencies talk with troops about terrorism and explain ways to safeguard. . . .? There were a total of 139 responses as follows:

- | | |
|--|----|
| a. As a scheduled course of action | 18 |
| b. During high threat terrorist activity | 29 |
| c. Both a and b above | 35 |
| d. Neither a or b above | 57 |

Forty-one percent of respondents stated that no one from an outside agency talked with their troops relative to terrorism. Written comments did state that commanders talked with troops if they had current information or knew what was going on. It was further expressed that this was rare since information did not filter down in a timely manner, was often vague, and usually classified.

Question 26: Did Military Police or other responsible agencies talk to families about terrorism? There were 131 responses, as follows:

- | | |
|--|----|
| a. As a scheduled course of action | 7 |
| b. During high threat terrorist activity | 17 |

c. Both a and b above	20
d. Neither a or b above	87

Sixty-seven percent of the respondents did not see any responsible agencies ever interacting with families relative to terrorism.

Question 27: Have you personally ever been involved in a terrorist situation of any kind? There were 168 responses to this question. While 140 answered that they had not been personally involved in a terrorist situation, 28 answered that they had. Written comments from these 28 vary greatly, from involvement in a bomb scare . . . being in an area hit by a bomb . . . to one respondent who had been shot by the PLO (this occurred in 1970) and his wife was raped. My interviews with some of these individuals indicated that there had been confusion, fear, and generally only reactive measures taken. There was in almost all cases an absence of preparation or preventive measures.

Question 28: This question allowed the survey population opportunity to make comment, suggestions, and recommendations with respect to terrorism; what the Army can and should do in preparing soldiers and families for overseas duty. There were as could be expected some rather specific and detailed comments. Of the total 175 surveys returned, 117 respondents made comments to question 28. The average response was hand written and covered almost the full page. While all the comments cannot be restated here, there was enough commonality to provide a series of "one liners" that captured the perceptions of those who chose to comment. The following is a collection of these comments: Note: certain critical statements were underlined by this author.

. . . must have comprehensive training for all soldiers at all military schools . . . prior to PCS overseas, service personnel and families should undergo mandatory POR qualification with mandatory briefings and classes on terrorism . . . soldiers must know the threat, be aware, and know preventative measures . . . the Army should publish for all ranks, detailed SOP or guide on ways to safeguard against terrorism . . . incountry briefings are essential . . . lets be honest with our people . . . the Army only pays lip service to terrorism preparation . . . must create a sense of awareness, it's not there yet . . . get rid of the USAREUR USA license plates for POVs-Americans stick out everywhere . . . we always seem to react to problems rather than make the hard decisions in advance that could prevent or minimize the situation . . . children must be involved in the training-ongoing programs at schools . . . awareness is the key and right now the Army is only pushing awareness to very senior officers . . . the DOD school is the most vulnerable and the most unprotected . . . we do a poor job, no we don't do anything at all in telling our junior soldiers and his family about what to watch out for . . . soldiers don't know what to really look out for--neither do most officers . . . soldiers and families should have non-DOD identifiable passports and papers . . . no rank is immune from terrorist yet we do little to inform and protect the individual soldier . . . families are really on their own in Germany, there simply are not enough MPs for security . . . perhaps more leased housing, get away from the large unprotected housing areas . . . Kaserne security is excellent but two miles away the housing area and school gets nothing--if they are after Americans, where do you think they are going to go? . . . should increase awareness through AFN like the OPSEC announcements . . . its a dollar matter like everything else, awareness programs will only come after some catastrophe . . . our training must be given in a manner so as not to alarm or frighten families, but should provide a warm comfort of knowledge and security . . . MPs don't kill tanks, so they continue to be reduced . . . we may have to wait for another 'Pearl Harbor' before we get our act together . . . mandatory, frequent encounter briefings are necessary . . . Americans, especially the younger soldiers, really stand out in a foreign country, a little training could help them blend in better . . . during terrorist alerts we closed the

kaserne, the soldier was on guard yet he could see his housing area, kids playing in the street--sure didn't seem right in the 'Year Of The Family' . . . neighborhood watch, increased MP and local security, are tools that might help . . . we need clear, up to date information to pass on to our people, and not something so classified that you can't brief . . . riding around in a marked staff car in greens and field grade cap is a good advertisement--for an incident . . . our personnel and families must understand the threat . . . families should be taught all the techniques on personal security, auto, and home security . . . our people have to learn they are not 'downtown U.S.A.' and they have to look and act different--and be a lot more alert . . . the Army could organize a top-down directed program that is bottom-up implemented--an education/awareness program . . . local commanders publish fact sheets/handbooks unique to the area--for everyone . . . we should not scare families but at least let them know that the Army is concerned for their welfare . . . real protection stopped at the Major General level where I was located . . . we should have closed housing areas . . . awareness and alertness is the answer and will only come if the Army makes it a 'front burner' issue . . . the naivete toward terrorism at some post borders on incompetence and is criminal . . . there is no real sense of urgency on this issue . . . terrorism gets good lip service but is a back burner issue--until of course, something happens, then we typically overreact . . . the Brits did an excellent job of making us aware and feeling protected, the US really did nothing . . . no one really knew the threat, it was too vague or too secret, so we mainly reacted . . . it is a matter of time until we lose a school or a school bus . . . National Guard and Reservist going overseas really have no knowledge of what is going on, we are pretty vulnerable . . . 1985 was a bad year, maybe DOD will do something . . . read a lot about tightening security at Embassies, what about military activities. . . .

The preceding is an overview of comments. While the aforementioned comments appear either critical or suggestive as to courses of action

(and there were excellent suggestions), there were some whose comments suggested that the terrorist situation was not really a problem or not cost effective to work. There were only five surveys with these type of replies but in fairness to objectivity, they are listed as follows:

. . . is this really a problem? Does the time, money, and effort justify the final results? . . . are families really in more danger in Europe than in New York, Washington, or Houston? . . . terrorism is not really a problem, I was briefed and felt completely secure, I made sure my family was too . . . we cannot create walled cities for our people and that is the only way to really protect them . . . studies like this becomes a scare tactic when there really isn't a problem. . . .

Notwithstanding the five replies, 96 percent of the 117 respondents did have some very good suggestive comments for ways the Army could move to address this situation. The central theme throughout the survey was that we do have a problem and need to quickly increase awareness at all levels.

Analysis of the Survey.

This section of the report will focus on an analysis of the survey results with an attempt to describe what the numerical responses actually means. While the approach used is very subjective, some conclusions can be drawn from the survey data. It is from these conclusions that recommendations can be made that hopefully will prove beneficial to the Army. The intent here will be to combine the numerical results with that of the written comments to develop meaning and reflect actual perceptions of the War College class. Readers should keep in mind the current terrorist threat and trend, and above all those initiatives and programs that have been implemented by the various government agencies, including DOD. The key is to focus on what is

actually being done and compare it with perceptions "from the field" as to how well these programs are being executed.

The high return rate on the survey, 70 percent, can be interpreted as a rather high degree of interest in terrorism shared throughout the War College class. If the class is considered a random sample or cross section of the Army (from the operational or troop level) then it can be further concluded that the interest in terrorism is fairly high throughout the Army. The survey further indicated that while the interest and expectation level is high, it is generally accepted that the Army is not placing enough emphasis on awareness and training of preventive measures relative to terrorism. That at least seems to be the perception at the battalion level and below.

The survey indicates that under current programs, the Army may not be doing a completely acceptable job in preparing its troop commanders with the tools to understand, operate, and manage an effective antiterrorism program. This holds true for the spouses of commanders also. The limited briefings given at precommand course are viewed as insufficient in scope, threat being vague, and generally inadequate in establishing preventive or protective countermeasures. One can ask that if this is a fairly accurate perception of battalion commanders, carefully selected and trained, then what can be the perception of the lower ranking soldier? The survey seems to suggest that leaders/managers at the 05/06 level are not really well trained, have feelings of vulnerability, and are frustrated with the way things are going. If this is really the case, then lower ranking personnel may have even stronger feelings.

The survey reflects a rather strong opinion that wives and families should be included in mandatory briefings and training. This information should include as a minimum, threat information, what is the actual situation, what is being done to protect them by other agencies, what they should watch out for, and how to employ defensive or protective measures as a standard course of action. Senior wives have indicated that this information is not only necessary for their personal well being and peace of mind but also to aid them in their role as community leaders in relating and working with other wives, especially junior wives. There was agreement throughout that information as projected here should be available and mandatory for families of all ranks.

The survey demonstrates that briefings and information presented in the foreign country is somewhat better than what is currently presented in CONUS. However, with 65 percent of the respondents stating that they did not receive information (and the comments indicated some information was received initially, but was insufficient) it must be concluded that the program is still not meeting the needs of those assigned to the area. The emphasis on awareness of terrorism remains according to the survey, only "luke warm." It would appear that the ongoing programs are not filtering down as expected.

As a contrast, the survey did seem to suggest that other services such as the Air Force and Navy do a better job of creating awareness and preparing their personnel for service in potential terrorist threat areas. The British received considerable praise on their programs from those who had been assigned or worked in that area. State Department initiatives also appear to be a "front burner" issue and their personnel

feel that progress is being made. Army personnel see the emphasis from these other agencies and even though serving in the same area, perceive a lack of emphasis from their own service. In fairness, this is not always the case as some areas and commands do a better job than others. It was interesting to note from the surveys that the amount of attention depended on where one was assigned. The concern is that it is variable and not consistent.

It was clear from the response (75 percent) that leaders do perceive a real terrorist threat overseas. It is largely viewed as a high threat. Whether the threat is real or not is not the issue. If a threat is perceived then it becomes real. Education and awareness becomes the only viable solution. If we are to believe the survey results that suggests that awareness is not at a high enough level, then it becomes necessary to take some step(s) to alter this view. In light of increasing terrorist activity both in frequency and severity, it stands to reason that the threat is here to stay. The problem is then what to do about it. Research has shown that there are good programs ongoing. The survey indicates that they are not enough.

Greater than 50 percent of the survey respondents indicated that they were uncomfortable with their knowledge of terrorism, the real situation, level of training, and general preparedness. If seasoned, veteran, career officers who are considered highly proficient and competitive have this feeling or perception, then one could conclude that the situation through the Army may in fact be even worse. The question now becomes, is terrorism a subject that education, training, and increased emphasis on awareness could improve the current attitudes and perceptions. My answer would be a resounding YES. There was a time

when the Viet Cong to some of us were hideous unknown monsters--greatly feared. It was amazing what a little training and awareness did to the myth. Unfortunately terrorism for most still remains at the myth level.

The high level (77 percent) of respondents who feel that the family (theirs or the young soldiers) was not comfortable or prepared indicates a possible problem. Agree or not, it is a fact that families play a significant role in the morale, discipline, and combat readiness of a unit. Unhappy, uninformed, and fearful families do not send happy, motivated soldiers to work. If that soldier is overly concerned with worry about his family or distracted by fears for his family, then his mind cannot be devoted to the mission. The bottom line is that families need to be brought on board with education and awareness of the terrorist situation. They do not need to be alarmed or scared but they do need to feel an adequate level of awareness, sense of protection, and knowledge of protective measures. They will have more of a sense of belonging to the Army team and a feeling that the Army really does "care." The survey really questioned whether the Army really put forth enough effort toward educating families and eliminating those fears of the "unknown."

The level of families having a feeling of vulnerability is simply too great to ignore. If this feeling is among the 05/06 level what can it be among the lower levels? Again, right or wrong, if Army families serving overseas have a feeling of vulnerability, then the Army has a problem. The argument exists that all families serving overseas must accept a greater level of risk. While this may be true, it certainly seems to make sense that every possible action be taken to lower this risk to the lowest level.

It cannot be said that there are no real concerns over terrorism. The survey both by number and written comment indicates a real and growing concern over terrorism--at all levels. With every terrorist act, and 1985 was a banner year, concerns continue to mount. We do not want to reach the point where soldiers attempt to avoid overseas service for fear of terrorism. Even worse would be the reluctance of families to accompany their husbands on an overseas tour. That could easily result in an unhappy and miserable soldier. While these may seem like little things, I would suggest they are possibilities, better headed off now, rather than having to resort to some massive program after the attitudes have developed.

Almost 80 percent of the respondents perceived a real terrorist threat in their last overseas tour. Again, right or wrong, the perception is there and with that perception a problem. The Army is not yet at the level of educating an awareness and comfort level within its personnel. Perhaps it is important here to discuss briefly the reaction of the class to the terrorism lectures given earlier in the academic year. The lectures were given terrible ratings by the class, the frustration level even during the lecture ran high. Here was a collection of the "Army's finest" at the War College receiving a classified lecture that was vague, did not really offer anything constructive, and hardly any of the questions could be answered due to "sensitivity." (Note: not the fault of the presenters but rather the degree of classification.) There was great consternation after these lectures. Basically we were told nothing. The frustration for most followed their immediately preceding two or three years of command when the same level of vagueness had persisted. Terrorism is viewed as a

critically important subject but it seems almost impossible to find anyone who can present it in any depth, at least to a level that one could use in formulating plans or policies. It is rampaging around the world and all we seem to be able to do is "whisper" about it.

While respondents did not necessarily view themselves as a primary terrorist target, they did feel that the threat was present and increasing rapidly. Areas such as kasernes, facilities, and housing were viewed as high threat. As discussed earlier, while the numerical response didn't rate DOD schools high relative to other areas, the verbal comments throughout the survey gave cause for concern in this area. While some respondents agreed that a "school attack" most probably would not occur since it would damage what little support the terrorist have, the December 1985 airport bombings in Vienna and Rome altered that attitude. These incidents proved that nothing is sacred or protected when the terrorists want to make a statement to the world.

As a point of digression, one need only contemplate the impact of an isolated terrorist attack against a US School or school bus overseas. It would be a serious morale blow to the families serving in the area. Some families would want to immediately return to the states causing increased family tension and separation. There would be a great outcry from citizens across the United States as to why schools were not protected in a known threat environment. Political pressure might force Congress to initiate debate or legislation on the need to keep servicemen stationed abroad. One could imagine the consequences on NATO. Of course high level investigations would convene, as they always do after a tragedy, to find fault and place blame. There is no way the military could win and many careers could be terminated. (Remember the

Marine incident in Beirut?) The reactions could go on but the message is clear. The cost of our allowing something like that to occur without at least some prevention is too great to consider.

Other areas viewed as high threat were travel, temporary duty, military convoys, staff cars and uniforms, and the current USA plates on privately owned vehicles. Survey respondents felt vulnerable while traveling or TDY status especially if in uniform or in a clearly marked military vehicle such as a military sedan. Military convoys were also viewed as vulnerable but other than increased alertness (knowing what to look for) little else could be done. Respondents generally preferred to travel in civilian clothes and in unmarked vehicles. The response against the USAREUR POV license plate was overwhelming. Even though it is now white, it remains in size, shape, and marking as clearly American. Numerous wives have also advocated the use of the German license plates. The general theme throughout is to avoid sticking out like a foreigner and particularly like an American in those areas where Americans might not be so popular.

It was interesting to compare the level of security/safety from the numerical analysis with that of the written comments. Clearly there is concern that while we do a good job of securing our kasernes and facilities, we do little or nothing for housing areas and schools. Families especially notice this when, during high threat periods, we barricade the kaserne, increase guards, and pull in all the soldiers. Yet, two miles away (sometimes much closer) the housing area is open to anyone who wants to drive through, and there is no security there. This does little to eliminate or downgrade that feeling of vulnerability. While it may well be argued that housing areas and schools are deemed

not targetable by terrorist and perhaps there are some few who are enlightened enough to know this; somewhere, somehow, someone should let the young soldiers wife know all this. What she views on television is the increasing acts of violence, the severity of violence, and the apparent indiscriminate killing associated with these acts. She may take a far different view of the security of her living area than the local security manager who has all the "facts" locked in his safe. The statistics are such that her perceptions just might be right. It would seem better to take the preventive steps now rather than wait and have to be reactive.

Although there are numerous programs designed to educate and prepare the soldier for the potential terrorist environment, the survey indicates that "something is broken." Perceptions are that little is being done at the soldier level. The survey indicates that in essence, no one from responsible agencies actually talked with the troops relative to terrorism--other than the commander. The commander is often frustrated by lack of information, confusing or vague information, or information that is classified to the degree that he cannot discuss it. Some of the messages received in Germany evoked memories of the Pearl Harbor message . . .

something may occur . . . not sure what . . . take necessary precautions . . . don't do anything to create alarm or fear . . . be careful of the message your actions send . . . be prepared. . . .

While the aforementioned is obviously fictitious it does parallel the often vague messages received, which were usually classified Secret.

The system is not completely broken as there are in being good plans and often very detailed information is received but it is

invariably geared at the installation and not at housing areas or relative to soldier's families.

Almost 70 percent of the respondents indicated that families were left out when it came to information or actions to take relative to a terrorist situation. This lack of information or perhaps only the vagueness brought home by the servicemember can only lead to confusion, frustration, and fear of the unknown--those elements that can adversely impact morale, discipline, and combat readiness.

Review, Survey of Foreign Service Personnel

As a part of this report it was necessary to search outside the realm of DOD and research the attitudes and perceptions of other agencies and if possible assess any recent data. The purpose would be to compare that data with the Army War College Survey and determine if comparisons or divergents occur.

The Foreign Service Journal, a major professional publication for State Department personnel conducted an informal study/questionnaire in March 1985 as to perceptions on security and terrorism.²¹ While the data represents 182 respondents, the views can be considered as a subjective view of career foreign service personnel primarily from the active ranks of those serving in the field and to a lesser degree, retirees. A limited review of the results of that survey is presented as follows:

- a. Ninety-one percent agreed or strongly agreed that serving overseas will become increasingly dangerous over the next 10 years.
- b. Eighty-nine percent agreed or strongly agreed that Foreign Service personnel serving anywhere in the world are likely targets of terrorism.

c. Only 12 percent agreed that foreign affairs security have done all they could over the past few years to safeguard employees against terrorism.

d. Forty percent agreed strongly and 39 percent agreed that the September 1984 bombing of the embassy in Beirut could have been prevented by reasonable security precautions.

e. What was most important in decreasing threats?

Thirty-nine percent said increase physical security.

Twenty-seven percent said decrease the number of people.

Twenty-seven percent said increase intelligence efforts.

Nine percent said retaliate.

The written comments, like those on the Wa College survey were very revealing. They voiced almost unanimous concern that while security at embassies was increased, housing and personal security were being neglected. Training was the predominant comment. There was clearly a desire for more and better structured training, particularly "hands-on" training in preventive or protective measures. There were comments on the need to treat terrorism like the serious and real threat that it is. The perception prevailed that while security upgrade was being improved, there still seemed to be a lack of emphasis within the system. Also noted was the variance in the degree of security probably dependent on the local station chief. In summary, the results of this survey indicated a perception that the effort at "the top" was not matching the need in the field.

My purpose in presenting the brief details of this unofficial survey is to demonstrate how closely parallel the responses are between the two surveys. Both solicited a candid, nonattributable response and

in all likelihood, recorded some very real feelings. The point is that from two relatively different agencies, the response is generally the same--a concern that enough is not being done and that there is a real problem "out there."

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This report has demonstrated that enough evidence exist to allow the presentation of certain specific conclusions. While this report is by no means all inclusive, available facts can be reached. They are:

- a. Terrorism has significantly increased over the years with an alarming surge over the past 5 years.
- b. The lethality and destructive power of terrorism is at an all time high and expected to continue to improve as technology progresses.
- c. Terrorist acts have no concern for collateral damage, injury or loss of life to the innocents, regardless of age, sex, race, creed, culture, or religious background.
- d. Hostility toward Americans abroad and resulting acts of terrorism/violence toward Americans will continue to escalate.
- e. Terrorist targets long considered predictable are now outmoded by a new wave of attacks that can be directed at anything, anytime, and anywhere. Nothing can now be considered as nontargetable by terrorist.
- f. The terrorist threat to US Army personnel overseas is very real. The military is a prime target for terrorist and indicators are that increasing acts of violence directed at service personnel will continue to occur.
- g. The War College Survey indicates a strong interest and concern over terrorism. The survey reflected these views:

- (1) Perceive a real threat.
- (2) Feelings of inadequate preparedness.
- (3) Feel a high degree of vulnerability overseas.
- (4) Families do not feel protected or informed.
- (5) Low to nonexistent security for housing areas and schools.
- (6) Have not been given adequate training or information.
- (7) Families are not included.
- (8) A perception that the Army is not placing enough emphasis on terrorism counteraction or that it is not filtering down the chain.

h. The Foreign Service personnel survey reflected strong feelings of vulnerability, lack of security, and insufficient education. This survey very closely paralleled the War College survey.

i. The Army has recognized a need for a terrorism counteraction program and has initiated a number of programs aimed at preparing the force. The major emphasis did not get underway until 1983.

j. It is quite possible that despite the ongoing programs throughout the Army and DOD, the actual awareness and education may not be filtering down to the soldier level--at least that was the predominant perception from battalion commander level.

In all fairness to governmental agencies, the attitudes and perceptions found in this study may in fact, now be overcome by events. Most respondents of the War College study attended the precommand course prior to May 1983. It is quite possible that the new Army initiatives came later and the class simply missed the output of the new programs.

What becomes alarming is that the survey class was in a position to fairly judge the events in the field until June 1985. Their perceptions did not improve. Further, the March 85 survey of Foreign Service

personnel also captures a recent perception. The question arises, are we really paying lip service to terrorist programs? Are the programs geared for the Army as a whole--all ranks? While our training programs are clearly highlighted (Annex 3 and 4), are they really getting the right training, preparation, and awareness to the right people? This study cannot answer those questions but the information available suggest that it is not happening.

The extreme sensitivity and classification of information prevents a thorough indepth research of material relative to terrorism. It is altogether possible that the real facts would disprove the findings as contained in this report. But, from the unclassified perspective, and that is the level that most of our junior soldiers and their families view the matter, it appears that we have not yet reached a level of training commensurate with the need.

Recommendation: This report was prepared within time constraints, limited access to sources and key personnel, and in all probability it is missing vital facts. There is however, enough information to suggest that there might be a problem. The single recommendation would be:

That the Army initiate a full and unrestrained study that would allow a complete review of all the relevant facts (both classified and unclassified) and conduct a real time study in the field at the soldier and family level to assess the level of awareness and level of need.

The purpose would be to assess if in fact the Army does have a problem with its terrorism counteraction program. It is essential that the Army's program be applicable to soldiers of all ranks and include their families.

It is the hope of this writer that no such problem will be found and that the perceptions recorded in this study are now overtaken by

events and the Army is moving ahead aggressively with a terrorism education program. On the other hand, this is one area we cannot afford to focus our full attention and effort, the cost of unpreparedness is far greater than we can afford to pay.

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